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CASES AND MATERIALS

ON ENVIRONMENTAL

LAW AND POLICY.

By

Eva H. Hanks, A. Dan Tarlock, and John L. Hanks. St. Paul,
Minnesota: West Publishing Company. 1974. Pp. xxx, 1242.
$20.00.

Problem: How does a law teacher singularly interested in empirical research address the task of reviewing a textbook designed for
use in a law school course in Environmental Law?
Solution: He adopts the book and then generates data by inducing
a relevant population of consumers of the textbook-students using it
in his class-to prepare ongoing assessments of their studies. This
information is systematically collected and evaluated and then integrated with his own observations made while teaching from the textbook, and the results are reported.
While the solution stated above may not represent an ideal empirical
strategy for preparing a review of a new casebook, it does have one
strong feature which commends it over conventional formats for reviewing law-related books chiefly intended for uses outside the classroom. Although many criteria may apply equally to textbooks and other
scholarly works, one important characteristic of a textbook is how well
it holds up in the daily give and take of the classroom. Thus, systematic
recording by students and teacher of their reactions to the book's utility
as a vehicle for facilitating learning of the subject matter ought to
furnish valuable data in evaluating this critical facet of textbook
quality.
It would be dishonest, however, to create the impression that the
review which follows is the result of such a carefully planned research
strategy as that described above. Rather, this review is a good illustration of the pervasive role serendipity plays in scholarly pursuits.'
1In September of 1974 I began teaching Environmental Law at Stanford using tear
sheets of this casebook, which had not yet emerged from West's bindery in final form.
I was then finishing another book review at the time, and was impressed at the extent to
which it was necessary to achieve a thorough command of the substantive content of the
area covered by a book to attempt a serious evaluation of its utility as a teaching tool.
Activated by this insight, I decided to expose my students to the same intellectual process
by requiring a review from them. In December, I distributed this question as a part of

the final exam:
Prepare a book review of the portions of Hanks, Tarlock & Hanks assigned
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Before considering the students' and my own assessments of the
casebook as a teaching tool, several comments should be made about the
book from a somewhat broader perspective. This review discusses many
aspects of the book, and the individual comments should not be considered to be an evaluation of the whole. At the outset, the authors
should be strongly commended for their courage in attempting to create
a comprehensive textbook in this subject at this time. Lesser spirits
would have easily been discouraged by the prospect that the next round
of congressional action or the next wave of judicial decisions would
moot or render obsolete substantial portions of their work. This is not
to suggest that the authors were foolhardly in undertaking their project;
quite the opposite is true. They clearly appreciated the temporal quality
of much of the material used and sought to counteract the probability
of its early obsolescence by using it not as an end in itself, but rather as
a means to construct and illustrate an analytical framework for dealing
with issues of environmental quality which hopefully will have a more
enduring utility. Their relative success in developing, communicating
and defending this intellectual framework will be :aken up later. For
now, it is sufficient to observe the potential transcicnce of much of the
legal material and to praise the authors' strategy irt attempting to suggest ways of thinking about the basic problems whicii will not be significantly affected by even major changes in the contrclling statutes, regulations, or judicial decisions.
Many law teachers, including some who teach the subject, still
regard Environmental Law as a non-subject. It is easy to understand
why this skepticism should exist, considering that as recently as six
years ago no law school offered a regular course in the subject. The
for coverage in class. Besides addressing such obvious matters as organization,
comprehensiveness and clarity of presentation, your review hould also consider
the extent to which cases, readings and notes explore basic principles and develop
unifying themes in ways which lend coherence to the subject.
One month later, I received 35 student reviews of the book, wich averaged ten pages
in length. (Most students, I might add, agreed that the question was pedagogically successful in causing them to work harder to gain control of the whole course and to search
for underlying themes and organizing principles.) Between the time the examination
question was distributed and the time the answers were receive4, I was invited to prepare this review of the book, and then first saw the potential for ,sing the evaluations as
raw material in my own writing-serendipity in its purest form.
To organize the data I simply took careful notes of each stucent's views as I graded
the question. The comments which follow represent an attempt to integrate the students' evaluations of the textbook with my own reactions, which are based on six years'
accumulation of reflections on the subject and its teaching.
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first published teaching materials in the field were marketed in 1970.2
Yet today almost every reputable law school has at least one offering
for which this volume would be an appropriate textbook. Other reservations relate to the substantive content of the material. The concern
is that Environmental Law is not a separate and identifiable body of
legal doctrine, but is rather an amalgamation and application of principles
and policies currently explored in other standard courses. To particularize the charge, Environmental Law consists of one part applied civil
procedure (access to courts), one part natural resource law (water and
mineral rights and public land laws), a dash of torts (nuisance notions),
a pinch of constitutional law (due process and state-federal relations),
and four parts administrative law (rulemaking, discretionary decisionmaking, public participation, and judicial review functions). This characterization is accurate, as far as it goes, but exactly the same sort of
2

Although earlier Water Law and Natural Resources Law books had touched on
environmental protection problems, the first true environmental law textbook was prepared by Professor Gray and published by the Bureau of National Affairs (BNA) in
1970. A second edition of

0. GRAY,

CASES AND MATERIALS ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW waS

published in 1973. BNA staked out a further claim on this embryonic subject with the
commencement in 1970 of its Environmental Reporter series, the volume which reprints
cases being the most frequently cited source among environmental law sources (E.R.C.).
Also in 1970, the Environmental Law Institute first began publishing its Environmental
Law Digest. In 1971 this publication matured into the Environmental Law Reporter
(E.L.R.).
The year 1971 brought to the fore a veritable flood of environmental law teaching
materials. Professors Meyers and Tarlock captured a lion's share of the early market
by publishing a paperback adaptation of several chapters of their Water Law textbook,
C. MEYERS & A.D. TARLOCK, SELECTED LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF ENVMONMENTAL PROTECTION (1971). Professors Jaffe and Tribe published their course materials for
a somewhat wider ranging and more thoughtful examination of environmental law problems. L. JAFFE & L. TRIBE, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (1971). Professor Grad also
published an interesting and reasonably comprehensive textbook in 1971. F. GRAD, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: SOURCES AND PROBLEMS (1971).

But of all the 1971 books, it was

Professor Krier's work that most clearly established the tone for later efforts. J. KaxER,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY (1971), focuses on a single environmental problem,
air quality, and examines it with great rigor from both legal and economic perspectives.
In 1972 two new entries appeared. E. TUCKER, LEGAL REGULATION OF THE ENVIRONMENT: TEXT, CASES AND PROBLEMS (1972)

is a short paperback survey of a broad spec-

trum of legal problems related to environmental protection. It is the first textbook prepared with students outside the law school clearly in mind. The second textbook to issue
in 1972, 1 A. REITZE, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1972), contains the richest collection of

nonlegal material and is presumably intended for multiple-purpose teaching use. A second
volume of Professor Reitze's work was published in 1974 as A. REITZE, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING (1974).
Aside from the second edition of Gray's book, the only further contribution from the
academic community in 1973 was Grad's Treatise on Environmental Law, which is not
intended for classroom use.
The law has developed so rapidly that without current supplements most of the books
produced before 1973 are seriously deficient in major areas. Thus the Hanks-TarlockHanks book has arrived on the scene at a propitious moment in terms of the potential
market for its adoption.
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observations could have been made about the field of labor law during
its infancy, and perhaps about trade regulation and other commonly
recognized legal specialties in which the major thrust of the law school
course is to examine the ways in which the legal system affects and is
affected by a significant emerging social problem.
Since 1970 the heightened federalization of the legal response to
environmental quality problems, organized chiefly around NEPA,3 the
Clean Air Act of 1970," and the FWPCA Amendments of 1972' has
created a comprehensive and complex body of law that now directly or
indirectly affects every citizen in the land. The full social and economic
impact of environmental regulation under these new federal statutes is
yet to be felt. Viewing these laws against the background of their
state level counterparts and other local, state, and federal controls on
private and public activities which have spun off frora the environmental
movement, it would now appear difficult to sustain the argument that
Environmental Law has no independent legal content.6
It probably was never easy to construct a teachable textbook, but
market forces have developed recently which make the task increasingly
difficult. The standard textbook today must not only present legal source
material in a cogent and orderly form, it must also provide extended
notes discussing problems related to the primary materials as well as
encyclopedic references to collateral authorities and further readings,
some of which are necessarily in other discipline3. In short, many
popular law school texts are also first-rate research tools in their fields,
and are consciously purchased and retained as such by their consumers.
Environmental Law and Policy provides a good illustration of a few
of the pitfalls associated with production of a heat ily annotated textbook. First, it should be stated that the book is indeed thoroughly researched and richly documented. As might be anticipated in situations
of multiple authorship, however, the character and pedagogical import
3 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 [hereinafter NEPA], 42 U.S.C. §§

4321-35 (1970).
'42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-58 (1970).
5 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 12 U.S.C. § 24i 15
U.S.C. §§ 633, 636, 31 U.S.C. § 711, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-65, 1281-92, 1311-28, 1341-45,

1361-76 (Supp. III, 1973).

1 Doubters should examine the recently published 1600 pages in ENVRONMENTAL LAW

(E. Dolgin & G. Guilbert eds. 1974). The
fact that the implementation of these laws embroils the traditional agencies of government in the same problems of role identification, policy formulation, statutory construction, and constituency management that are encountered in other fields of law surely
does not justify the subsumption of Environmental Law into Administrative Law or
any other conventional law school course on which it may be thotght to impinge.
INsTITuTE, FEDERAL ENVmONMENTAL LAW
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of the notes and questions is somewhat uneven. For example, a brief
two-page note is tacked on the end of the NEPA section surveying
difficulties experienced in dealing with scientific uncertainty with respect
to the regulation of potentially toxic materials. The Reserve Mining
case,7 the long battle to cancel the registration of DDT and other persistent pesticides, and the 1972 FIFRA amendments8 are all covered in this
short note (at 427-29). As one of the authors has demonstrated in a
subsequent work, techniques for handling scientific uncertainty about
potentially toxic substances are deserving of considerably greater attention." In contrast, in a later chapter substantial portions of three
recent circuit court opinions are reprinted without comment in a 13page note (at 1027-40) focused on the relationship of state and federal
proceedings in the approval and enforcement of state implementation
plans under the Clean Air Act. The substantive content of these three
cases could easily have been summarized in a few paragraphs. These
examples were deliberately selected to make the point about unevenness;
fortunately they are atypical, for the book generally reveals a good
sense of proportion with regard to this type of material.
A somewhat different problem that several students reported concerning the notes was that they occasionally were so attenuated or discursive that they blurred the main point the authors wanted students to
think about. One possible example of this complaint is the highway
litigation material surrounding Overton Park," a case ostensibly presented to provide groundwork upon which to construct analyses in later
cases involving judicial review issues. Overton Park is also fine vehicle
for examining the difference in judicial function between cases where
the court recognizes a clear congressional preference as to how agency
should rank competing factors and the more typical case where no such
preference is found. The extended discussion of related Highway Act
7 Reserve Mining Co. v. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, 2 E.R.C. 1135 (Minn.
Dist. Ct 1970), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 294 Minn. 300, 200 N.W.2d 142 (1972);
United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 56 F.R.D. 408 (D. Minn. 1972) (approving parties),
380 F. Supp. 11 (D. Minn. May 11, 1974) (granting injunction), injunction stayed, 498
F.2d 1073 (8th Cir. June 4, 1974), application to vacate stay denied, 418 U.S. 911 (July 9.

1974), supplemental opinion recommending reinstatement of injunction, 380 F. Supp. 11,
71 (D. Minn. Aug. 3, 1974), application to vacate or modify stay denied, 419 U.S. 802
(Oct. 11, 1974), injunction modified, case remanded, F.2d - , 7 E.R.C. 1618 (8th
Cir. Mar. 14, 1975).
8 [Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act] 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (Supp.
III, 1973).
See Tarlock & Gelpe, The Uses of Scientific Information in Environmental Decisionmaking, 48 S. CAl. L. Rzv. 371 (1974).
10 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), reprinted
at 233.
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cases was felt by some students to distract their attention from the major
points of Overton Park, with the result that later they had to keep
rechecking to get the salient ideas firmly in mind.
Although I did not find fault with the textbook on this ground,
from a teaching perspective the students may be correct in sensing that
a point of diminishing returns has been reached in some of the new
generation of textbooks in which the volume of the detailed information
presented overwhelms and obscures the central contours of the subject
matter.1 The argument that such a wealth of material enables the instructor to be creative in tailoring the course to his or her own preferences ignores the fact that it ordinarily takes two or three passes at
teaching a course from a particular textbook to develop a sufficient feel
for how best to handle the materials to be confident in loosing one's creative impulses. By this time many teachers are ready to switch texts in
the interest of avoiding staleness. Yet this may be a fair tradeoff for
using a coursebook that can justifiably be retained for reference purposes.
Earlier the authors were praised for undertaking a comprehensive
text in such a dynamic area as environmental law. One risk of opting
for the heavily documented style of book it its early obsolence as a research tool. Ideally, in so rapidly developing a field a book of this type
should be published in looseleaf form so that it co-ald be conveniently
updated at relatively frequent intervals. I assume the authors do intend
to prepare periodic supplements. If so, this will alleviate most of the
problems in using the book as a reference work, but classroom use of
the text grows more cumbersome as the supplements expand. The
recent reversal of Judge Bue's monumental opinion in Sierra Club v.
Froehlke" illustrates the point. The authors devote 60 pages to reproduction of this veritable judicial anthology of environmentalists' favorite
holdings. The Fifth Circuit reversal by no means saps the opinion of its
intellectual vitality, at least for pedagogical purposes, but of all the issues
are ultimately resolved contrary to Judge Bue's views, what is to be done
with this roughly 5 percent of the book? How satisfying it would be to
have the opportunity to open a binder lock and replace the obsolete
case with fresh material.
"1For an example of a textbook which presents sufficiently copious note materials
to raise the "diminishing returns" issue, see C. DONAHUE, J., T. KAUPER & P. MARm,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROPERTY

(1974).

In fairness, much of the note materials in

this book seem addressed to the student whose curiosity is piqued by a topic, and are designed to stimulate hard thinking about the central problems.
1z Sierra Club v. Callaway, 499 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'g Sierra Club v.
Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
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A final criticism relating to the presentation of the note material
must be addressed primarily to the publisher and not to the authors.
The students unanimously reported confusion bordering on exasperation in trying to follow changes in notes among the authors' comments,
statutes, quotations from secondary sources and quotations from cases.
Part of the difficulty could have been avoided had the authors subdivided note materials with more headings, subheadings, and other
change signals, but most of the problem stems from the seeming incompatibility of extensive note treatment with West's two-column layout.2 '
II
A brief sketch of the substantive content of the book might be
helpful at this juncture to better understand the detailed comments which
follow. The book is divided into five chapters" followed by an extensive
appendix containing reprints of key statutory and regulatory materials.
As noted earlier, the authors have attempted to organize the presentation of material around unifying themes which hopefully provide a
durable framework for rigorous analysis of the hard issues raised by
efforts to factor environmental protection into public decisionmaking.
Their basic approach is to focus steady attention on the allocation of
decisionmaking responsibility and then frequently to substitute an econ12a What may be a new alltime high point in textual ambiguity occurs in the notes
following the Getty Oil case in chapter V (pp. 1026-43). For some 13 pages the reader
must circumnavigate what appears to be a continuously revolving judicial opinion in
which the judge is deciding three cases simultaneously. Careful inspection of colons
and imperceptible changes in type font reveal that there are, in fact, three different
opinions, some of which quote from others. Cryptography skills ought not to be required for reading law materials.
13 The first chapter provides 92 pages of introductory nonlegal material designed to
acquaint the reader with some of the major intellectual issues associated with the environmental movement. Chapter II is roughly twice as long and is focused on Population, one of the current issues introduced in chapter I. With chapter III, which covers
270 page-, the reader begins the major substantive coverage of the book. The chapter
is entitled Judicial Review of Complex Decisionmaking. It examines briefly various
types of decisionmaking models, considers problems of access to courts and conventional
notions about the function of judicial review, and then devotes extended coverage to the
problems of adjusting the legal process to accommodate requirements created by NEPA.
Chapter III concludes with a short excursion into public utility regulation.
Chapter IV is designated Land and Resources Management and Control. In 250
pages it deals mainly with the policies and structures for the management of the public
domain, looking at both multipurpose management and withdrawals for exclusive use,
such as the Wilderness System. The chapter also provides a short survey of recent developments in the planning and regulation of private land use.
The final chapter addresses Pollution Control in 383 pages. Nearly half of the
chapter is devoted'to private rights and remedies for pollution and includes an extended
development of the nuisance concept from both legal and and economic standpoints. The
balance of the chapter takes up public measures to control pollution, with primary attention given to air pollution control.
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omic lens for purposes of evaluating both the process and the decision.
A question which recurs throughout the book is where, within the
legal process, should primary responsibility rest for determining the
proper balance between environmental protection and other important
social objectives. Most often the issue materializes in the context of
the need to posit a role for the court in reviewing discretionary decisionmaking by an administrative agency under circumstances where the
tradeoffs between environmental risks and other costs are uncertain.
The recent explosion of legislative, administrative, and particularly
judicial decisions wrestling with environmental issues makes this a
logical and almost sure-fire organizing theme; sure-fire because it casts
the course in the same mold as most other law school courses which
also are primarily oriented towards exploring the inevitable series of interinstitutional conflicts and adjustments we grandly label "legal
process."
To facilitate thinking about the who and how questions regarding
environmental decisionmaking, the authors regularly interject insights
borrowed from modern microeconomic analysis. Under ideal conditions such an analysis can provide a framework for thinking about both
the process of decisionmaking and the decision to le made. Unfortunately, ideal conditions seldom obtain. The economic analysis seems mislocated at times, and on occasion it plainly gets in the way of efforts to
obtain a clear grasp on legal process issues. Further, because the authors
generally are unwilling to offer their own economic analysis of a problem, the rigor with which the economic analysis is applied is inconstant.
The quality of the analysis depends largely on the extent to which the
particular problem under study or its analogue has been worked through
by competent economics writers. The relative scarcity of such
work means that too often the intended analysis sharpness either because
it must be extrapolated from writing originally prepared for a quite
different purpose or because the best available direct material is unclear.
Where the selected economic literature is well written, the approach
usually succeeds in engaging the law students' attention temporarily (no
small achievement); when the note material is weak it reinforces the
students' instinctive bias against nonlegal material.
An even more serious problem arises from the fact that in hard cases
where the analysis would be most useful, the information base is usually
so deficient that it is impossible to bring the theory to bear on the problem. Under such circumstances the main utility of economic analysis
is to identify factors which should be considered and suggest how they
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may interact, to indicate techniques for acquiring needed information
and for hardening "soft" data, to provide methods for deciding whether
the acquisition of certain needed data is worth the cost, and to compare
the cost effectiveness of alternative methods for achieving specific desired results. These are useful things to know, but they rarely impress
law students who have been inculcated with the common law urge to
resolve today's case today on the basis of the best information at hand.
The authors should be commended and encouraged for their efforts
to integrate law and economics in this area where decisionmakers often
seem to have lost a firm grip on economic reality. On the other hand,
their plan to bind together the diverse decisionmaking exercises by
applying the gauze of economic analysis suffers from a noticeable,
though perhaps inevitable, shortfall. Until economics more seriously
turns its attention to the practical problems of applying theoretical
models in the real world, it is doubtful that the objectives of the authors'
integrative design can be fully realized.
Returning briefly to the role of the court in respect to the basic
legal process theme, the casebook's organization of the materials stymied
development of a valuable historical perspective on the changing role of
the judge in what we now denominate environmental cases. If major
attention is to be focused on the judicial function in environmental law,
it probably aids student understanding to begin the inquiry with pollution control and particularly with the private nuisance cases where the
judge has long had a distinct balancing responsibility involving public
interest considerations. Moving through public nuisance into the development of state level regulatory agencies charged with controlling
pollution draws attention to the narrowing role of the court. It also
provides a comfortable occasion for examining the conventional administrative law principles governing the relationship between courts and
regulatory agencies. A brief look at the history of state level regulation
facilitates understanding the sense of urgency that permeates the current generation of federal pollution control laws and leads naturally
into an analysis of the tough issues regarding the judicial role that
have emerged under the new federal acts.
In pollution cases the court is trying to work out its function in
relation to an agency the primary mission of which is environmental
protection, but which must consider other factors in the public interest.
From here only a mild dislocation is experienced in shifting the inquiry
to cases where the court is dealing with agencies that have other basic
missions, but which under NEPA or other specific statutory directives
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also have a clear duty to include environmental factors in their calculus
of the public interest. I submit that formulating a sensible judicial role
in these cases is easier with the pollution developments in the background
than vice versa. To appreciate the issues regarding the proper allocation
of decisionmaking power that underline the current cases, it plainly
helps to have an historical perspective on the evolution of the legal
system's response to environmental protection needs. In this connection
it is worthwhile to note the number of times the authors found it necessary to include cross references to chapter V in chapter III, in comparison to the paucity of cross references running the opposite direction.
My recommendation is that users of the book consider taking up the
material in chapter V before tackling chapters IlI and IV.
III
The material in chapter I, "Perspectives," is both essential to the
purpose of the book and difficult to use effectively in the classroom.
The chapter introduces the reader to most of the important ideas or
issues which permeate environmental protection. The selections explore
viewpoints mainly from ecology, philosophy, and economics. Covered
are such questions as the validity of various ecocatastrophy predictions;
whether a basic rethinking is in order concerning our economic goals
and the way we perceive our relation to nature; what are the causes of
our current problems-technology, population, affluence, decrepitude
of our social institutions, or some mix of these; what are the ethical
foundations of policies designed to protect and conserve resources; what
relative reliance should be placed on natural science disciplines versus
social sciences and law in defining and solving environmental problems.
By and large the material selected fulfills its mission. The only selection which seems somewhat out of place is Justice Douglas' dissent in
Sierra Club v. Morton," which endorses Professor Stone's suggestion
that legal standing should be granted to natural objects. 5 Although it
does reinforce the prior article calling attention to the homocentric
tendencies of our intellectual traditions, this is the only selection with a
narrow legal focus, and it would appear to fit better in the later discussion of standing. If it is deemed imperative to develop this ethical theme
further, excerpts from Aldo Leopold or Thoreau uould add both insight
and elegance to the study."
14405 U.S. 727, 741 (1972).
is Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?-Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects,

45 S. CAL. L. REv. 450 (1972).
16

Although these sources have become available since the book was published, two
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The teaching difficulty in using this material would be no greater
that that experienced in handling other nonlegal readings, except that
ordinarily such material is intended for immediate application to a discrete legal problem. Here the material is presented for the purpose of
initially exposing students to a number of valuable concepts with the
hope that later the relevance of the ideas to specific problems will be
seen and reflected upon. Although the students generally enjoyed these
readings and did not resist spending classroom time in discussing them,
these ideas were quickly repressed when the examination of the "law"
commenced. In part the students' failure to search for occasions to
relate most of these perspectives to later inquiries is attributable to the
fact that the authors choose to reinforce continually only the economics
theme. As a teacher, I found keeping the legal and economics concepts
clearly in mind enough of a challenge to prevent worrying about the
dropping out of other perspectives; but notes or questions tying the
noneconomic perspectives into the remainder of the materials where
relevant would undoubtedly enrich the course and also serve to counteract the student's view that such material is extraneous.
My class skipped the chapter II treatment of population due to
time constraints, so there are no student reactions to report. The
thrust and location of the chapter raised two questions in thinking
about if and when to take it up. First, it is a debatable pedagogy to
defer for too long examination of the mainstream problems of environmental law. To the extent chapter II continues the exploration
of nonlegal perspectives introduced in chapter I, there is a risk of losing
the interest of students who are strongly oriented towards more conventional lawyer's fare. Second, the choice of legal materials is perhaps
inappropriate to the rest of the course. To be sure, the privacy and
other basic personal questions addressed in the cases raise facinating
policy issues, but this material will have already studied by most
students in their Constitutional Law course, and probably from a perspective not significantly different than that presented by chapter II.
To the extent that population control concepts provide a different perspective on environmental law questions, it would seem more relevant
to take up the difficult problems to population concentration and dispersal
arising under current pollution control strategies employing transportation and land use plans, as well as under exotic new schemes adopted
other prime candidates for developing the ethical-philosophical perspective are Meyers,
An Introduction to Environmental Thought: Some Sources and Some Criticisms, 50 IND.
L.J. 426 (1975); Tribe, Ways Not to Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundationsfor
Environmental Law, 83 YALE L.. 1315 (1974).
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by local governments to control growth and development."
The title to chapter III, "Judicial Review of Complex Decisionmaking," is slightly misleading in the sense that not only this chapter
but the rest of the book is more or less focused on this basic theme.
This is the part of the book, however, where the authors choose to
look most closely at the legal structure for environmental decisionmaking. The examination starts with a brief introductory look at alternatives to the traditional judicial model for deciding factual and policy
issues. Because this short excursion proceeds at a highly generalized
level and is dropped abruptly in favor of a note outlining the case for
greater judicial involvement in environmental decisionmaking, it is
difficult to know how seriously to take the authors' professed interest in
alternatives to the juridical model. Information about the operation
and utility of nonadversary modes of decisionmaking is important to
rigorous thinking about the institutional choices faced in environmental
cases. A more thorough coverage would seem appropriate," though
undertaking the investigation after probing the efficacy of the judicial
approach would make even more sense.
Access to the courts is the next topic addressed in the chapter. The
section heading indicates that only "selected issucs" will be presented;
the students uniformly felt that the authors were too selective in their
coverage. The material presented on standing is excellent. My only
reservation concerns the decision to explore at length Sax-type statutes
in connection with standing questions. I fear tbe sharp issues raised
by such proposals in respect to basic themes corcerning the scope of
judicial power are blunted by viewing their remedial impact as primarily
addressed to standing problems. The sovereign immunity and Freedom of Information Act sections are also solid, but no explanation is
offered as to how an environmental litigant might use the latter. Also
unclear is why the authors chose to take up these two topics, which so
far have rarely arisen in environmental lawsuits, and to omit coverage
of the other, more common jurisdictional and procedural issues that
are frequently troublesome. Without converting t1 e text into a litigant's
handbook, it would appear helpful to explore cursorily such topics as
the statutory basis for an environmental claim, jurisdictional amount,
value, requirements for obtaining temporary relief in equity, bonds,
27 See Lamm & Davison, The Legal Control of Population Growth and Distribution
in a 18
Quality Environment: The Land Use Alternative, 49 DEqvan L.J. 1 (1972).
As a minimum expansion, I would recommend using 3ome of Professor Tribe's
writings. Most apropos would be Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology?, 2 PHM.
& PuB. Ar. 66 (1972).
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and class actions. Some of the material which is awkwardly placed in
chapter V under the heading "Emerging (and Submerging) Modes of
Environmental Litigation" might be profitably covered in this context.
Also relevant at this juncture is the whole range of administrative
law devices that may be employed by a court to refuse to accept a case:
these would include such principles as exclusive jurisdiction, finality,
ripeness, exhaustion of remedies, laches, and primary jurisdiction. The
coverage of these doctrines need not be thorough, but some road map
should be provided to prevent unnecessary wandering in the "wilderness
of administrative law."' 9 A survey of the full range of potential legal
problems that may prevent getting to court in a typical environment
lawsuit should not only facilitate getting at the tough systematic problems raised later in complicated cases examined for that purpose, but
may also satisfy the yearning of some students for a touch of reality in
this somewhat conceptual area. One method for structuring this exercise
in applied federal jurisdiction and procedure would be to trace an imaginatively designed hypothetical case through the complete sequence from
preparation to appeal.
If the full dimensions of the access-to-court problem are to be
sketched, more should also be presented concerning the peculiar difficulties of the organizational plaintiff acting as a public interest litigant,
including judicially awarded attorney's fees as a possible alternative for
financing such activity. The notes on standing introduce this area of
inquiry, but nowhere does the text follow through with a thoughtful
examination of the critical role that has been played by the public interest
litigant in shaping contemporary environmental law. I cannot say
exactly how or where this topic should be developed, but somewhere in
a book like this consideration should be given to the operation and functions of watchdog groups like the Sierra Club, EDF and NRDC, which
exert so crucial an influence on the development of environmental law.
Chapter III next takes up the central issue of standards to be applied by a court reviewing a decision affecting the environment. The
material presented focuses on Overton Park20 and Scenic Hudson2 as
landmark cases announcing what the authors refer to as "common law"
principles for judicial review of environmental decisions. The "common
law" designation obviously refers to the pre-NEPA chronology of the
'19See Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environmental Lawyer in the Wilderness of AdLaw, 70 COLum. L. REv. 612 (1970).
ministrative
20
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), reprinted at 233.
21
Scenic Hudson Preserv. Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 941 (1966), reprinted at 247.
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cases, since both involved APA review of agency compliance with
specific legislative directives. Adverting further to chronology, no
clear reason appears for the authors' choice to present the two cases in
reverse of their historical order. Putting aside notions of "leading
from strength," I can see value in taking the cases in the natural order,
particularly in view of the Supreme Court's endorsement of the Second
Circuit's approach to the task of judicial review. 2 Also, although intervention in agency proceedings was taken up in the preceding section
as it related to standing, it would seem advantageous to use Scenic
Hudson as a vehicle for developing the topic somewhat more fully.
Other than in these respects, the material presented is thorough and
generally develops the conventional judicial review doctrines lucidly.
The one suggestion that most students offered for improvement of this
section was to set out the relevant APA sections at one place and in
their entirety so that the courts' discussions in these and later cases could
be more easily followed. Besides the statutory provisions themselves,
some further development of the judicial tradition in interpreting and
applying the APA would also be a useful background for handling the
problems raised by recent environmental cases.
Having laid the groundwork for the thinking about judicial review,
chapter III next introduces NEPA and examines both agency and court
efforts to interpret and implement the legislative policies, with the
emphasis placed on judicial response. The NEPA section opens strongly,
presenting the Act, along with a good note on legislative history, and
then moves directly to the landmark Calvert Cliffs case." Enough has
been written about the significance of Judge Wright's classic opinion in
shaping the legal future of NEPA to make further remarks here superfluous. It is interesting to note, however, that the matter-of-fact style
in which the case is presented by the authors tends to underplay its impact, particularly in comparison with the seminal role one of the authors
has attributed to the case in other writings.2"
To set the stage for later cases, it might have been useful to devote
some attention in the notes to Judge Wright's ideas regarding the standards for judicial review under NEPA at different stages in an agency's
implementation of the Act's requirements. The notes after Calvert
22

See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971)

cation).

(by impli-

23Ilavert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971), reprinted
at 266.
24See
Tarlock, Balancing Environmental Considerations and Energy Demands: A
Comment on Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. AEC, 47 IND. L.J. 645

(1972).
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Cliffs (pp. 278-85) do trace in detail the AEC's efforts to carry out the
court's directives in adjusting the agency's decisionmaking procedures.
This is one of the few times in the text that such impact data are presented. A number of students noted this fact and expressed disappointment at the lack of similar follow-through notes in respect to other leading cases. In defense of the authors, the AEC experience is somewhat
atypical; reliable information is not currently available on the internal
adjustments made by most other federal agencies to the procedural demands of NEPA, nor, for that matter, have there been developed any
data from which an evaluation can be made of the impact of the NEPA
process on final agency actions.
The notes after Calvert Cliffs also introduce the Greene County"
problem of delegation of responsibility for preparing the impact statement. This is an appropriate juncture in the casebook to consider this
issue because it relates primarily to the agencies' operating procedures
for complying with NEPA requirements. The discussion of Greene
County is thorough and leaves the student with the correct impression
that the issue is far from settled.
The next step in exploring the legal developments under NEPA
focuses on "threshold" determinations. The section begins solidly with
the Hanly cases2" and the development of the "negative declaration"
requirement. The note following the cases rigorously examines the
issue of the standard for review of an agency's threshold determination that NEPA does not require preparation of an impact statement,
and it accurately suggests that, while courts have difficulty agreeing on
a verbalization of the appropriate standard, most of them use a strict
standard, but one which falls short of de novo review.
Up to this point, the development of the NEPA materials is nearly
flawless, mut starting with the note after Hanly, signs begin to appear of
organizational trouble ahead. While the Hanly notes adequately consider some related threshold questions, such as at what point in the
execution of a federally funded private project do NEPA obligations
attach, and does the "lead agency" concept approved by the CEQ Guidelines2 7 conform to the policies of the Act, they noticeably omit another
class of issues that are arguably of threshold significance. These issues
25

Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409

U.S. 849 (1972).
26 Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 990 (1972), reprinted at 285; and Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
908 (1973), reprinted at 289.
2736 Fed. Reg. 7724-29 (1971), discussed at 310-11.
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might be grouped together as "timing" problems. Retroactivity questions, for example, are briefly discussed in isolation 80 pages later.
More importantly, the S.I.P.I.28 case and related timing problems, such
as the use of umbrella or programic impact statements, are treated in
the book as problems of scope or adequacy of impact statements. This
organizational choice is eminently defensible, but NEPA is a sufficiently"
difficult area to understand to make it desirable, whenever possible, to
segregate functionally similar issues, both for purposes of exploring the
reach of the substantive requirements under the Act and for addressing
questions relating to standards for judicial review. It is submitted
that the problems at issue are more closely related to other threshold
questions than they are to typical cases involving issues of the adequacy
of impact statements. Treating them as threshold problems leads to
application of a more appropriate standard of judicial review.
While proper functional treatment of retroactivity, S.I.P.I., and the
umbrella impact statement is clearly debatable, the same cannot be said
for the authors' handling of the distinction between judicial review of
the adequacy of an impact statement and review of an agency decision
using the impact statement to balance environnmental considerations
against other factors the agency must consider. In fairness, the courts
do not always see this distinction clearly, and admittedly there is a
class of cases in which the agency has already made its decision and the
main function of the impact statement is to serve as a check to determine
the need for a reconsideration, but these exceptiorns do not excuse the
authors from a duty to promote straight thinking about the issue. In
the 121-page section dealing with judicial review of the impact statements, students uniformly voiced dissatisfaction with this section. Without doubt, the section contains all the material necessary for a close
analysis of both the standards applied to determine the adequacy of
impact statements and the review role played by the court, but the organization poses a formidable obstacle.
Rather than report how this section is organized, I will attempt to
suggest how I think the inquiry should be approached. The suggestions
that follow are almost 180* different than the casebook's order. In
the first place, it would be helpful to reproduce sorewhere in the book
the CEQ Guidelines. Though without the force of law, the Guidelines
play a prominent role in the way agencies seek to carry out their NEPA
duties, and they are regularly adverted to by courts. Next, it would be
28 Scientists' Inst. for Public Info. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973), reprinted at 415.
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appropriate to explore the judicial interpretation given to section 102 (2)
and specifically the handling of the five points in section 102(2) (c).
Examination should be made of the concepts of "full disclosure" and
"good faith objectivity." NRDC v. Morton29 should certainly be read
and contrasted to National Helium8 0 on the duty to identify and evaluate
alternatives.
Only then would it be desirable to investigate the extent of a duty
to perform, within the impact statement, a cost-benefit analysis comparing environmental harms and benefits with the technological, economical, and social aspects of the proposed activity. A substantial part of this
section of the book is devoted to an investigation of various maximization theories that might be useful in carrying out such a balancing
exercise were it a required element of the impact statement, which it
generally is not.8' At this juncture the unit would close with an attempt
to develop a workable standard for judging the adequacy of an impact
statement. Without wishing to be pinned down too closely, I think the
standard should run something along these lines: Could a conscientious decisionmaker be reasonably expected to make a responsible decision
among the alternatives on the basis of the environmental information
presented in the impact statement?
Having disposed of questions of impact statement adequacy, the
discussion would then turn to formulating a standard to guide judicial
review of the agency's final decision on the proposed activity, the decision
being based on the impact statement. Here it would be appropriate to
consider judge Oakes' proposal for differing standards based on the
relative expertise of the agency with respect to the factual issues involved
in the decision.82 It would also be fruitful to examine anew the literature
on policy science maximazation analyses and other ideas about the
characteristics of "good" public decisionmaking. In the final analysis,
however, the judicial standard settled upon for general use in reviewing
final agency actions under NEPA is likely to bear a strong resemblance
to the formula announced in Overton Park." The courts will scrutinize
closely the manner in which decisions are made to ensure that agencies
29

Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 148 U.S. App. D.C. 5, 458 F.2d
827 (D.C. Cir. 1972), reprinted at 403.
s0 National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 361 F. Supp. 78 (D. Kan.), rev'd, 486 F.2d 995
(10th Cir. 1973).
31 See EDF v. Armstrong, 487 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1973) ; Daly v. Volpe, 376 F. Supp.
987 (W.D. Wash. 1974). In fairness to the authors, it must be admitted that at the time

the text was written it was much less clear how receptive the courts would be to the
proposition that the impact statement should present a careful cost-benefit analysis.

32 See Oakes, Developments in Environmental Law, 3 E.L.R. 50001 (1973).
83

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), reprinted at 233.
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take a "hard look" at environmental factors, but the decision itself
will be subjected to only the most rudimentary commands of rationality.
The outline above is neither novel nor original. It is the conventional mode of thinking about issues of judicial review of impact statements and agency decisions based on those statements. Why this organization should have so completely eluded the authors I am at a loss
to explain.
The final section in chapter III takes a brief look at selected issues
in public utility regulation. Other than a short examination of marginal
cost pricing, the section concentrates mainly on problems of determining
sites for power plants and transmission lines under both state and federal
requirements. The section holds together well, but it is not clear why
it is located in chapter III instead of with the other land use planning
material in chapter IV.
It would be unfair to characterize chapter IV, "Land and Resources
Management and Control," as either dull or prosaic, but it lacks the
sense of dynamism conveyed by chapters III and V. Few students had
any comments about the chapter. This may be because it was deferred
until the end of the course and was covered quickly, but more likely the
lack of student comments was a function of the subject matter itself
and of the learning responsibility it placed on the students. The main
challenge in chapter IV is the assimilation of the public land laws,
hardly a stimulating undertaking. In this context, even the public trust
doctrine comes across as a charming, but largely irrelevant, refugee
from another legal era.
The inherent arbitrariness of the executive withdrawals doctrine
and the potential for plunder under the General Mining Law of 18723"
are revelations which cause initial shock, but they are soon accepted as
part of a basically exploitive system of public land management. Within
this context the discretionary powers of the Forest Service to oversee
the harvest of the national forests, and of the Bureau of Land Management to permit grazing on the public domain, appear downright rational.
Excerpts from the Public Land Law Commission Report and samples of
proposed statutes make it appear doubtful that these bureaucratic
fiefdoms will be toppled in the near future. Students did not react
favorably to the authors' description of the Forest Service's internal
decisionmaking procedure and suggested that more material of this
type would be valuable elsewhere in the book.
There is some effort to inject an economic frame of reference into
3130 U.S.C. §§ 22-42 (1970).
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,chapter IV, but the seeming boundlessness of administrative discretion
in this area makes these analyses appear more peripheral than usual. The
legal process facets of the chapter serve mainly to reinforce and illustrate
insights acquired in chapter III. For example, while NEPA is a
powerful tool for compelling public land managers to study the environmental impacts of their plans, once the studies are completed, it is
doubtful whether the range of administrative discretion has been significantly narrowed. Most of the public domain is managed under broad
multiple-use policies. The difference in judicial scrutiny between final
administrative acts done under a multiple-use management authorization and those done under a single purpose mandate (such as the Wilderness Act3 5) is reminiscent of the contrast between ordinary NEPA
cases and Overton Park. Where the court can perceive a legislative
preference for environmental preservation values, it is strongly enforced;
but in the absence of such a preference, the management agencies are
given a relatively free rein to determine the public interest.
The one part of the chapter that attracted particular student comment was the section on user participation in decisionmaking (p. 495).
The aim of the book in this area is to call attention to the public interest
problem in confiding participation to citizens benefiting from the exploitive features of the agency programs. The students pointed out, however, that this is one of several places in the book where the authors could
have rationally included a discussion of the potential problems in implementing the highly visible, maximum-citizen-participation style of public
decisionmaking that is frequently recommended as a partial cure for
agency decisions which shortchange environmental values. NEPA
and the new federal pollution control acts, for example, envisage extensive public participation in administrative decisions involving significant environmental impacts. Questions that occurred to the students about putting this theoretical model into practice were: 1) Could
citizen inputs reasonably be expected to "correct" potentially unsound
bureauratic decisions, assuming that the inputs were presented in a
timely and usable fashion? 2) Could the latter assumption ever be fully
realized given the lack of resources and the inconstancy that typify
citizen efforts? and 3) Is there a danger that too much citizen participation could hamstring needed agency action, and if so, what limitations on
participation should be allowed? Materials presenting perspectives for
evaluating these questions would be useful somewhere in a book like
this one. This short section on private land use control appears well
35 Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-36 (1970).
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conceived and executed, but it was omitted from coverage in my class on
the ground that the students had already studied the cases in their
Property course-a not uncommon situation, I would expect.
The chapter V coverage of pollution is divided between private
rights and public control. Time constraints plus the knowledge that my
students had explored much of the material in their Torts course led
me to omit the private rights material. I am generally familiar with the
material presented, however, and judge the book's treatment to be
both thorough and rigorous.
The public control section opens with an extended consideration of
economic alternatives to traditional legal regulatiorn for the control of
environmental pollutants. The material selected makes the points well,
but I wonder if the readings would not have a greater impact after the
student has worked his or her way through the regulatory approach.
At the end of the economics introduction, the reader is abruptly
confronted by the lengthy InternationalHarvester case 6 and the complexities of moving source regulation under the Clean Air Act.37 Students
suggested that an introductory note tracing the legislative history of
the Clean Air Act (along the lines of the note preceding NEPA) might
have both eased the transition and facilitated an understanding of the
background of the case. As noted much earlier, I would add to this
suggestion the thought that it would be useful to include some historical
material on state efforts to regulate air and water quality.
The material after International Harvester raises, but does not
pursue, the judicial review theme; rather, it traces further developments
in the issues raised in the principal case and the implementation of controls on fuel additives. The track taken is certainly worthwhile; however, the authors miss the opportunity to carry forward their judicial
role theme. The majority and concurring opinions in International
Harvester, along with law review follow-ups by judge Leventhal" and
Judge Wright,3 9 provide rich material for discussing the role of the
court in reviewing agency decisions based on complex scientific evidence.
Of special interest is the issue of how hard courts should push, through
application of such judicially created norms as "principled desision3

6International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973), re-

printed at 902.
3742 U.S.C. §§ 1857-18571 (1970), reprinted at 1090.
39
Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA.

L. REv.
509 (1974).
39

Vright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of Judicial Review,
59 CORNuL L. REv. 375 (1974).
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making"4 and "Kennecott Statements,"'" to judicialize agency decisionmaking processes.
The chapter next takes up stationary source regulation under the
Clean Air Act and again off with a tough case, Portland Cement, 2 without any prior introduction, except a terse warning to read the Act.
Particularly helpful at this juncture would be an introductory note
addressing the difference between ambient standards and emission
standards, differenting emission standards based on ambient standards
from ones based on technological capability, and discussing the distinction between existing polluters and new sources of pollution. Consistent
with the treatment of International Harvester, the notes do not press
the student to analyze the principal opinion in terms of the standard of
judicial review the court is applying; instead, the authors initiate a
thorough and lucidly presented review of the Clean Air Act provisions
relating to the establishment and enforcement of emission standards.
The student is encouraged to evaluate, from an economics perspective,
the drive for uniformity in emission standards.
The chapter moves on to consider Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus"' and
EPA's reluctant response to the court's recognition of a nondegradation
policy implicit in the Act. Strict enforcement of a nondegradation
policy is so likely to create significant diseconomies, it is surprising the
authors forgo the opportunity to expose the policy to economic analysis.
The authors' inclusion of the lengthy EPA documents analyzing implementation of a nondegradation policy is particularly timely in view
of subsequent developments that have made the concept a major issue
in both air and water quality control programs.4
The remainder of the air pollution materials examines problems in
approving and enforcing state implementation plans under the Clean
Air Act. The authors present a detailed reprise of legal difficulties
experienced to date as reflected in court decisions seeking to resolve
ambiguities in the Act in ways which both preserve the integrity of
the overall regulatory design and recognize the large stakes at issue.
Many of the difficulties stem from the basic design of the Act, which
40 EDF v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 597-98 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
41See Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1972). For an example of such a statement see Supplemental Statement in Connection with Final Promulgation, 37 Fed. Reg. 5767 (1972).
42Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 158 U.S. App. D.C. 308, 486 F.2d 375
(D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974), reprinted at 946.
43344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C.), aff'd per curiam, 4 E.R.C. 1815 (D.C. Cir. 1972),
aff'd by an equally divided Court, 412 U.S. 541 (1973), reprinted at 970.
44See 40 C.F.R. § 52.21 (1974), 39 Fed. Reg. 42510 (Dec. 5, 1974) ; 5 BNA ENv.
REP. CURRENT Drv. 1655 (Feb. 21, 1975).
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seeks to implement a federal program through primary reliance on state
regulatory agencies. Among the issues covered by the text are tensions
between state and federal agencies in specifying what types of state
standards and regulatory strategies will meet federal requirements, in
administering temporary relaxations of statutory timetables and requirements, in determining the extent to which federal facilities must
adhere to state regulations, and in establishing enforcement strategies
during periods of shared state-federal responsibility.
Special attention is given to defining issues for which restrictive
judicial review is provided with respect to standards and implementation plans. The urgency that infects this task i, caused by section
307(b) of the Act, which forecloses consideration of these issues in
subsequent enforcement actions. Because the Act specifically authorizes
citizen suits for certain purposes, an effort is made to identify the
decision points which can trigger citizens' actions. Neither the potential
utility nor disruptive effects of such suits are explored, however.
Another issue addressed briefly in the chapter is the character of
the hearing required before the adoption of implementation plans containing emission standards. Here again the courts, in determining
what the Constitution requires and what Congress intended, are challenged to suppress their own ideas on the best systera for such decisionmaking. The task of reconciling the Act's hearing provisions with the
recognized APA models is difficult and sensitive. Both regulated
parties and interested citizens are pressing for an adequate opportunity
to make their case on the reasonableness of the standards and control
strategy. The case materials selected by the authors are good, but the
focus of the inquiry could have been improved with the inclusion of
some note material raising some of the hard systerric questions.
The final matters taken up under the Clean Air Act are the requirement and implementation of regulations governing indirect or complex sources of pollution and the necessity for including transportation
plans and land use plans as part of state implementation plans. These
control measures raise extremely difficult administrative questions, few
of which are yet close to resolution. The materials do as good a job
as possible under the circumstances of alerting the student to the legal
and economic implications of these control strategies.
The chapter ends with a lengthy note on the FWPCA Amendments
of 1972,," followed by a recent case expanding the concept of navigability
45See note 5 mupra.
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to its outermost bounds. The authors do not explain their decision t&
relegate to note treatment the most significant legislative overhaul of
the nation's water pollution control effort. Perhaps they assumed that
the parallel to the Clean Air Act developments would be so great as to
make extensive treatment of water pollution control redundant. Although the Acts are similar and many of the implementation issues
will develop along parallel paths, the differences between the regulatory
efforts are sufficiently great to make likely the hypothesis that the
authors simply ran out of steam and decided to shut down. The same
theory would explain the absence of any treatment of noise and solid
waste disposal as pollution problems. Given the length of this review, I
have great sympathy for the notion that there must ultimately be a
stopping point. Therefore I will not comment further on what appears
a premature termination to the pollution chapter, other than to lament
the lost opportunity for useful cross-media comparisons in evaluatiIg
efforts to apply similar legal control strategies to different resources.
IV
In conclusion, there are several points that should be emphasized
about the Hanks-Tarlock-Hanks book and the foregoing review. While
some readers may detect a predominantly critical tone to this review, it
would be wrong to conclude that the final judgment is negative-it is
not. The authors are too serious about their work to appreciate hearing
only the things they did well; nothing is duller to write or more boring
to read than unmitigated praise. On the other hand, one of the risks
in undertaking this type of detailed evaluation of teaching materials is
that the reviewer ultimately finds fault with the book for not presenting
exactly the materials, in precisely the order, to enable him to teach the
course he wants to teach. I hope my comments stress appropriately the
strong features of the book, while escaping the teacher's natural tendency
to be overly picky. All comments, favorable and critical, are offered
in a constructive attempt to join with the authors in enhancing our
collective grasp on the subject and in improving our teaching effectiveness.
Environmental Law is a new and evolving subject, still lacking a
well-defined structure. Under these conditions, the authors have rendered an invaluable service to students, teachers, and other in the legal
community by publishing a challenging set of classroom material that
double as a first-class reference book. In my opinion, the book is without peer among its competitors; therefore I highly recommend it to
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other teachers of the subject. Perhaps of greater significance, the
students' reaction to the book was equally favorable.
N.
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